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    By the Kripkean argument, only the reassembled ship has any claim puro being the original ship, \(O\)

    01.05.2023 Swipe visitors  No comments

    If we grant that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship, we seem to have a solution puro the ship of Theseus paradox. But this success is short lived. For we are left with the following additional paradox: Suppose that \(S\) eventuates from \(O\) by replacing one part of \(O\) one day at verso time. There seems to be widespread agreement that replacing just one part of verso thing by per new exactly similar part preserves the identity of the thing. It follows that either the Kripkean argument is incorrect, or replacement of even verso celibe part (or small portion) does not preserve identity (per view known as “mereological essentialism;” Chisholm 1973).

    This can be seen (though it may already be clear) by considering a modified version of the ship of Theseus problem

    As indicated, Kripke denies that his argument (for the necessity of origin) applies esatto the case of change over time: “The question whether the table could have changed into ice is irrelevant here” (1972, 1980). So the question whether \(O\) could change into \(S\) is supposedly “irrelevant.” But Kripke does not give verso reason for this claim, and if cases of trans-temporal identity and trans-world identity differ markedly in relevant respects — respects relevant esatto Kripke’s argument for the necessity of origin, it is not obvious what they are. (But see Forbes 1985, and Lewis 1986, for discussion.) The argument above was simply that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship since there is a possible world sopra which they differ. If this argument is incorrect it is mai doubt because there are conclusive reasons showing that \(S\) and \(S’\) differ. Even so, such reasons are clearly not “irrelevant.” One may suspect that, if applied preciso the trans-temporal case, Kripke’s reasoning will yield an argument for mereological essentialism. Indeed, verso trans-world counterpart of such an argument has been tried (Chandler 1976, though Chandler views his argument somewhat differently). Mediante its effect, this argument does not differ essentially from the “paradox” sketched per the previous paragraph (which may well be viewed as an argument for mereological essentialism). Subsequent commentators, di nuovo.g., Salmon, (1979) and Chandler (1975, 1976), do not seem to take Kripke’s admonition of irrelevance seriously.

    In any case, there \(is\) per close connection between the two issues (the ship of Theseus problem and the question of the necessity of origin). Suppose that when \(O\) is built, another ship \(O’\), exactly like \(O\), is also built. Suppose that \(O’\) never sets sail, but instead is used as a kind of graphic repair manual and parts repository for \(O\). Over time, planks are removed from \(O’\) and used onesto replace corresponding planks of \(O\). The result is a ship \(S\) made wholly of planks from \(O’\) and standing (con the end), we may suppose, in exactly the place \(O’\) has always stood. Now do \(O\) and \(O’\) have equal claim puro be \(S\)? And can we then declare that neither is \(S\)? Not according sicuro the Kripkean line of thought. It looks for all the world as though the process of “remodeling” \(O\) is really just an elaborate means of dismantling and reassembling \(O’\). And if \(O’\) and \(S\) are the same ship, then since \(O\) and \(O’\) are distinct, \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship.

    If so, then, by the transitivity of identity, \(O\) and \(S\) must be the same ship

    This argument is vulnerable preciso the following two important criticisms: First, it conflicts with the common sense principle that (1) the material of an object can be totally replenished or replaced without affecting its identity (Salmon 1979); and secondly, as mentioned, it conflicts with the additional common sense principle that (2) replacement by per single part or small portion preserves identity. These objections may seem puro provide sufficient grounds for rejecting the Kripkean argument and perhaps restricting the application of Kripke’s original argument for the necessity of origin (Noonan 1983). There is, however, verso rather striking problem with (2), and it is unclear whether the conflict between (1) and the Kripkean argument should be resolved per favor of the former.

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